Showing posts with label Zcash. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zcash. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 5, 2019

Zcash Counterfeiting Vulnerability Successfully Remediated

Document Outline:

Summary

Eleven months ago we discovered a counterfeiting vulnerability in the cryptography underlying some kinds of zero-knowledge proofs. This post provides details on the vulnerability, how we fixed it and the steps taken to protect Zcash users.

The counterfeiting vulnerability was fixed by the Sapling network upgrade that activated on October 28th, 2018. The vulnerability was specific to counterfeiting and did not affect user privacy in any way. Prior to its remediation, an attacker could have created fake Zcash without being detected. The counterfeiting vulnerability has been fully remediated in Zcash and no action is required by Zcash users.

The counterfeiting vulnerability was discovered by a cryptographer employed by the Zerocoin Electric Coin Company (aka The Zcash Company) on March 1st, 2018. It was not reported publicly at the time in order to protect against it being exploited prior to its remediation, and to provide information and remediated code to other projects that were also vulnerable. We employed stringent operational security measures to keep its existence a secret, even from our own engineers.

We believe that no one else was aware of the vulnerability and that no counterfeiting occurred in Zcash for the following reasons:

  • Discovery of the vulnerability would have required a high level of technical and cryptographic sophistication that very few people possess.
  • The vulnerability had existed for years but was undiscovered by numerous expert cryptographers, scientists, third-party auditors, and third-party engineering teams who initiated new projects based upon the Zcash code.
  • The Zcash Company has seen no evidence that counterfeiting has occurred as might be discovered by monitoring the the total amount of Zcash held in Sprout addresses (i.e., the Sprout shielded pool). As long as the value in the shielded pools are greater than zero, no counterfeiting has been detected. Bitfly’s Zcha.in displays these values on the network statistics page, and Zcash nodes report them in the output of the getblockchaininfo command.
  • Upon discovering the vulnerability, the Zcash Company took extraordinary measures to minimize the possibility of exploitation. The specifics of our steps taken are documented in the detail below.
  • The Zcash Company studied the blockchain for evidence of exploitation: An attack might leave a specific kind of footprint. We found no such footprint.

Although we believe that no counterfeiting occurred, we are monitoring pool totals and will act in accordance with our published defense against counterfeiting in an effort to preserve the monetary supply.

Zcash makes use of the most sophisticated and novel cryptography available on a public blockchain. Pushing cryptographic boundaries is inherently risky and user safety is of highest importance for the Zcash Company. We believe that the steps we have taken to mitigate the issue while working to ensure the safety of Zcash users has been successful. More information on the specific events that transpired from the initial discovery of the counterfeiting vulnerability through this disclosure will be covered in a future post.

Key Points:

  • A counterfeiting vulnerability was discovered in Zcash by a Zcash Company cryptographer.
  • The counterfeiting vulnerability has been fully remediated in Zcash and no action is required by Zcash users.
  • The successful remediation for Sprout addresses was introduced by the Zcash Company in the Zcash Sapling upgrade that occurred on the 28th of October, 2018.
  • The vulnerability was specific to counterfeiting and its exploitation would not have impacted privacy.
  • Zcash has not been susceptible to this attack since the Sapling activation.
  • We have found no evidence that the vulnerability was discovered by anyone else or that counterfeiting occurred.
  • The Zcash Company used best practices in operational security to keep this information private, and responsible disclosure to share it with two affected projects.

Background

On March 1, 2018, Ariel Gabizon, a cryptographer employed by the Zcash Company at the time, discovered a subtle cryptographic flaw in the [BCTV14] paper that describes the zk-SNARK construction used in the original launch of Zcash. The flaw allows an attacker to create counterfeit shielded value in any system that depends on parameters which are generated as described by the paper.

This vulnerability is so subtle that it evaded years of analysis by expert cryptographers focused on zero-knowledge proving systems and zk-SNARKs. In an analysis [Parno15] in 2015, Bryan Parno from Microsoft Research discovered a different mistake in the paper. However, the vulnerability we discovered appears to have evaded his analysis. The vulnerability also appears in the subversion zero-knowledge SNARK scheme of [Fuchsbauer17], where an adaptation of [BCTV14] inherits the flaw. The vulnerability also appears in the ADSNARK construction described in [BBFR14]. Finally, the vulnerability evaded the Zcash Company’s own cryptography team, which includes experts in the field that had identified several flaws in other parts of the system.

Importantly, the [BCTV14] construction did not have a dedicated security proof, as noted in [Parno15], and relied mainly on the [PGHR13] security proof and the similarity between the two schemes. The Zcash Company team did attempt to write a security proof in [BGG17], but it did not uncover this vulnerability. Zcash has since upgraded to a new proving system [Groth16] which has multiple independent proofs and significantly better analysis.

After finding the vulnerability, Ariel immediately contacted another cryptographer at the Zcash Company, Sean Bowe. After Sean confirmed the existence of the vulnerability, Zooko Wilcox (CEO of the Zcash Company) and Nathan Wilcox (CTO of the Zcash Company) were briefed. Through careful coordination, the counterfeiting vulnerability was mitigated in the Zcash network without any known further disclosure outside this group of four people.

With the activation of Sapling, Sprout transactions were moved onto the new [Groth16] proving system, fixing the issue on the Zcash network as described below.

To exploit the counterfeiting vulnerability, an attacker would have needed to possess information found in the large MPC protocol transcript that was made available shortly after the launch of Zcash. This transcript had not been widely downloaded and was removed from public availability immediately upon discovery of the vulnerability to make it more difficult to exploit. The Zcash Company adopted and maintained a cover story that the transcript was missing due to accidental deletion. The transcript was later reconstructed from DVDs collected from the participants of the original ceremony and posted following the Sapling activation.  

We have been monitoring the total of funds in the Sprout pool against time and have not found any indication that any counterfeiting activity has taken place.

Counterfeiting Vulnerability Details

The [BCTV14] parameter setup algorithm, as described by the paper, mistakenly produces extra elements that violate the soundness of the proof system produces elements that violate soundness. The construction described by [BCTV14] Appendix B is a variant of the [PGHR13] zk-SNARK scheme with modifications to improve performance and adapt the scheme for the asymmetric pairing setting. This scheme was used in the original launch of Zcash and has been independently implemented by several other projects.

Ariel Gabizon, a cryptographer employed by the Zcash Company at the time of discovery, uncovered a soundness vulnerability. The key generation procedure of [BCTV14], in step 3, produces various elements that are the result of evaluating polynomials related to the statement being proven. Some of these elements are unused by the prover and were included by mistake; but their presence allows a cheating prover to circumvent a consistency check, and thereby transform the proof of one statement into a valid-looking proof of a different statement. This breaks the soundness of the proof system.

The [BGG17] multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that produced Sprout parameters for the [BCTV14] construction follows the paper’s setup procedure verbatim, including the computation of the extra elements. They are not included in the actual proving key distributed to Zcash nodes since they are explicitly excluded from the parameter file format used by the proving routine implementation of [BCTV14] in the libsnark library (used by Sprout). However, these elements do appear in the MPC ceremony transcript. Consequently, anyone with access to the ceremony transcript would have been able to create false proofs.

What is affected?

While Zcash is no longer affected, any project that depends on the MPC ceremony used by the original Sprout system that was distributed in the initial launch of Zcash is vulnerable. This original Sprout system for shielded funds is comprised of the original Sprout circuit, the [BCTV14] proving system using libsnark, and the parameters generated by an MPC ceremony [BGG17]. It was used by the 1.x series of Zcash software (which also carried the “Sprout” name).

The algorithm described in [BCTV14], before the update corresponding to this disclosure, is vulnerable (though its libsnark implementation, when used with its built-in parameter generation is not). The vulnerability was included in some independent implementations of [BCTV14], such as [snarkjs], even though they do not require an MPC. Similar flaws can be found in the [BBFR14] and [Fuchsbauer17] zk-SNARK schemes.

We do not have an exhaustive list of all systems affected by this vulnerability, and we encourage all users, developers and maintainers of systems using [BCTV14] to take the time to triage this issue and check if they are affected.

Resources:

Original Sprout circuit implementation

Original Sprout zk-SNARK parameters: proving key and verifying key.

Sprout proving and verifying routines

[BCTV14]

libsnark proving system and its Zcash fork

What is not affected?

The newer Sprout-on-Groth16 system used by Zcash mainnet for Sprout addresses ever since the Sapling activation (block 419200 at 28 Oct 2018) is not affected by the counterfeiting vulnerability. It uses a new Sprout circuit, that runs on the Groth16 proving system, with new parameters, and operates on the BLS12-381 curve implemented in the Bellman library. The newer Sapling system for shielded funds, activated at the same time and using a new address format, is not vulnerable either.

The vulnerability is not present in the algorithms of [PGHR13] (which underlies [BCTV14]), nor in [BCGTV13], which used similar techniques. It is also not present in other zk-SNARKs constructions, such as [GM17] or [BG18], or in zero-knowledge proof systems that do not rely on a structured reference string. It is not present in libsnark when used with its built-in parameter generator.

Resources

New Sprout-on-Groth16 circuit implementation

New Sprout-on-Groth16 zk-SNARK parameters

New Sprout-on-Groth16 proving and verifying routines

Groth16 proving system

Third Party Disclosure

An analysis of the market cap of affected projects revealed that we could reach more than a two-thirds majority of affected capital with only two disclosures: Horizen, with whom we already had a reciprocal vulnerability disclosure agreement, and Komodo who we worked with to form a disclosure agreement in order to disclose this issue to them privately.

We established a ninety-day maximum public disclosure timeline with both parties, and provided the conditions required for a workable solution.

Further disclosure would have significantly increased the risk of exploitation of the majority of capital for much smaller gains in terms of coverage of users and capital. To protect the shielded pools of these and other projects, exact details of the cause of the vulnerability were redacted from the private disclosures. It appears that both Horizen and Komodo have taken appropriate actions per our recommendation. We recommend that third parties including affected projects, wallets, and exchanges, carefully consider how best to work through the upgrades needed to fix this issue.

Timeline of Events

01 March 2018

Ariel Gabizon, a cryptographer working for the Zcash Company, discovered the flaw while attending the Financial Cryptography 2018 conference, where he had been invited to present [BGG17] to the Bitcoin’18 workshop. Sean Bowe, a cryptographer at the Zcash Company, and Zooko Wilcox, the CEO of the Zcash Company, were also attending the conference.

The issue was discovered by Ariel the night before his presentation, and he contacted Sean to confirm. Sean met Ariel in person and the two contacted Zooko immediately. Zooko then met Sean and Ariel in person to determine a response strategy. It was quickly determined that the transcript (which would allow an adversary to create false proofs) should be deleted from where it had been publicly made available by the company, since it appeared unlikely that many had downloaded it until that point. Zooko contacted Nathan Wilcox, the CTO of the Zcash Company, to ask him to delete the transcript.

02 March 2018 – 27 October 2018

Nathan deleted the transcript under a coinciding operational security cover story.

Sean had an additional backup of the transcript, which was later transferred into the dual possession of Sean and Zooko (Sean kept an encryption key, while Zooko deposited the USB in a safe deposit box) until it was later decided to destroy the backup entirely.

Two mitigation strategies were proposed. Ariel proposed a mitigation which involved an emergency hardfork that required users to switch to new zk-SNARK parameters that did not suffer from the vulnerability, by re-randomizing or replacing the existing parameters in a subsequent ceremony. Sean proposed that the mitigation be covertly included in the Sapling network upgrade by switching to the Groth16 proving system and parameters constructed in the upcoming Sapling ceremony. The team agreed to adopt Sean’s recommendation.

Covert mitigations were developed and deployed without further known disclosures beyond these four individuals.

28 October 2018

The Sapling network upgrade activated successfully on the Zcash mainnet, removing the counterfeiting vulnerability.

01 November 2018

The director of product security at the Zcash Company, Benjamin Winston, was briefed on the vulnerability and worked with the existing team to prepare disclosure packages for other affected projects.

09 November 2018

Josh Swihart, vice president of marketing and business development at the Zcash Company was briefed on the vulnerability in order to coordinate and prepare communications for two possible scenarios: full disclosure (this and related communications), or a leak by the parties to which information was initially released prior to the full disclosure date.

13 November 2018

The Zcash Company disclosed the impact and fix path of this issue to Horizen’s (previously known as ZenCash) security team (security@zencash.com) and Komodo (ca333@komodoplatform.com) using PGP encrypted email.

The Zcash Company did not disclose the specifics of the vulnerability, only its existence and our recommendation to upgrade their proving system to Groth16. We also did not tell them who else was notified. The complete message and disclosure sent to both Horizen and Komodo is copied below.

Three hours later, Zencash responded to say that they had decrypted our message and that they were looking into the issue.

16 November 2018

Komodo responded to say that they’d received the notification. Later communication made it clear that they were working on a fix.

18 November 2018

Sean reconstructed the transcript from the DVDs collected from the participants of the original ceremony. Sean posted the reconstituted transcript.

10 December 2018

Zcash Company team members (Benjamin, Josh, Zooko) met with the Horizen team by video conference. The Horizen team members present were Alberto Garofollo, Dean Steinbeck, Maurizio Binello, Rob Viglione, Rosario Pabst. In the meeting we discussed the timeline for full disclosure. The Horizen team asked to be given the details of the full disclosure prior to posting. We did not agree to provide them these details.

20 December 2018

Zooko notified and briefed David Campbell, COO of the Zcash Company.

05 January 2019

Zooko notified and briefed Zcash founding scientists Eli-Ben Sasson, Eran Tromer, Madars Virza and Matthew Green. These founding scientists, along with Alessandro Chiesa, were the original authors of [BCTV14] and [BGG17].

08 January 2019

Zooko notified and briefed Zcash founding scientist Alessandro Chiesa.

25 January 2019

Benjamin and Josh briefed John O’Brien, partner at Strange Brew Strategies, who serves as the Zcash Company PR firm, in preparation for supporting press inquiries.

29 January 2019

Sean and Ariel briefed Zcash company cryptographers Daira Hopwood and Jack Grigg.

Benjamin filed for a CVE number for this issue, and received CVE-2019-7167 from mitre.org.

31 January 2019

Benjamin and Josh met with Steve Lee from Komodo to coordinate the public release of information.

01 February 2019

Benjamin and Josh briefed Zcash team members Brad Miller, Elise Hamdon and Paige Peterson for readiness and assistance in preparation for public disclosure. Andy Murray, Zcash Company CFO, was briefed by David Campbell.

04 February 2019   

Jack Gavigan, head of product and regulatory relations was briefed.

The Zcash Foundation and its board members were briefed.

All employees and contractors working full time at the Zcash Company were briefed on a joint conference call.

Community member and forum moderator mineZcash (pseudonym) was briefed.

Sprout ceremony participants Derek Hinch of the NCC Group and John Dobbertin (pseudonym) were briefed.

CVE-2019-7167 details were updated.

05 February 2019

The Zcash Company public disclosure through the blog post, social media channels and direct contacts with other 3rd parties.

CVE-2019-7167 released with the text as shown in this post.

List of References

[BCTV14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879

[PGHR13] https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/279

[BGG17] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/602

[Parno15] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/437

[snarkjs] https://github.com/iden3/snarkjs

[Groth16] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260

Papers inheriting the soundness vulnerability from [BCTV14]:

[BBFR14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/617

[Fuchsbauer17] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/587

Technical Details of CVE-2019-7167

Title
*****

BCTV14 setup produces elements that violate soundness leading to Counterfeiting Vulnerability in Zcash and others

Description
**********

The construction described by [BCTV14] in Appendix B, is a variant of the [PGHR13] zk-SNARK scheme with modifications to improve performance. This scheme was used in the original 2016 launch of Zcash and has been independently implemented by several other projects.

Ariel Gabizon, while working for the Zcash company, discovered a soundness bug in [BCTV14] that is described in this security notice:

The key generation procedure of [BCTV14], in step 3, produces various elements that are the result of evaluating polynomials related to the statement being proven. Some of these elements are unused by the prover and were included by mistake; but their presence allows a cheating prover to circumvent a consistency check, and thereby transform the proof of one statement into a valid-looking proof of a different statement. This breaks the soundness of the proof system. We refer to these elements as “bypass elements.”

The [BGG17] multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that produces parameters for the [BCTV14] construction follows the setup procedure closely, and so the bypass elements are produced. They are not included in the actual proving key distributed to Zcash nodes since they are explicitly excluded from the parameter file format used by the proving routine implementation of [BCTV14] in the “libsnark” library (used by Sprout). However, these elements do appear in the MPC ceremony transcript. Consequently, anyone with access to the ceremony transcript would have been able to create false proofs.

The vulnerability also affects an older MPC scheme [BCGTV15]. This vulnerability was also included in some independent implementations of [BCTV14], such as [snarkjs], even though they do not require an MPC. Similar flaws can be found in the [BBFR14] and [Fuchsbauer17] zk-SNARK schemes, which are adaptations of [BCTV14].

Impact
*****

The ability to break soundness in the proving system permits the creation of false proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs are used in a system like Zcash to ensure that transactions are valid, so this bug this implies the ability to create an unlimited amount of shielded coins where the verifier is affected by this bug.

Credit
******

This vulnerability was discovered by Ariel Gabizon while he was working for the Zerocoin Electric Coin Company.

What is affected?
*****************

Any project that implements [BCTV14] and does not completely dispose of the bypass elements as part of the setup process.

That includes but is not limited to any project that depends on the trusted setup used by the original Sprout system that was distributed in the initial 2016 launch of Zcash. This original Sprout system for shielded funds is comprised of the original Sprout circuit, the [BCTV14] proving system using libsnark, and the parameters generated by an MPC ceremony [BGG17]. It was used by the 1.x series of Zcash software (which also carried the “Sprout” name).

[BCTV14] is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879

The original Sprout circuit implementation is here: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/tree/32d3a3352e45457f689585cc49d554599583bbd0/src/zcash/circuit

The original Sprout zk-SNARK parameters are here: https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-proving.key (sha256sum: 8bc20a7f013b2b58970cddd2e7ea028975c88ae7ceb9259a5344a16bc2c0eef7) and https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-verifying.key (sha256sum: 4bd498dae0aacfd8e98dc306338d017d9c08dd0918ead18172bd0aec2fc5df82)

The Sprout proving and verifying routines are here: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/685c0ab07fd90b244dac5e2cb1f069ac6151ec5c/src/zcash/JoinSplit.cpp

The BCTV14 proving system implementation (in libsnark) is here: https://github.com/zcash/zcash/tree/c938fb1f179d9bdefc5bc7e55fc6330a8b8d3713/src/snark/libsnark/zk_proof_systems/ppzksnark/r1cs_ppzksnark

What is not affected?
*********************

The newer Sprout-on-Groth16 system used by Zcash mainnet for Sprout addresses ever since the Sapling activation (block 419200 at 28 Oct 2018) is not affected by the counterfeiting vulnerability. It uses a new Sprout circuit, that runs on the Groth16 proving system, with new parameters, and operates on the BLS12-381 curve implemented in the Bellman library. The newer Sapling system for shielded funds, activated at the same time and using a new address format, is not vulnerable either.

The vulnerability is not present in the algorithms of [PGHR13] (which underlies [BCTV14]), nor in [BCGTV13], which used similar techniques. It is also not present in other zk-SNARKs constructions, such as [GM17] or [BG18], or in zero-knowledge proof systems that do not rely on a structured reference string. It is not present in libsnark when used with its built-in parameter generator.

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 circuit implementation is located here at time of publishing this information: https://github.com/zcash-hackworks/sapling-crypto/tree/master/src/circuit

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 zk-SNARK parameters are located here at time of publishing this information: https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-groth16.params

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 proving and verifying routines are located in the librustzcash library (at time of publishing): https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash

The Groth16 proving system is implemented in the Bellman Rust library: https://github.com/zkcrypto/bellman

Mitigation
*********

Users of projects still affected by this issue should change the zk-SNARK parameters to some that are not affected by this bug. Zcash switched to new parameters using a new “Sprout-on-Groth16” proving system as of the Sapling network upgrade on October 28th 2018, and so is not affected by the bug.

Therefore, users of Zcash do not need to take any action.

Projects still affected by this vulnerability that do not wish to switch proving systems might instead wish to perform their own parameter setup to produce replacement parameters. Projects following this path are strongly encouraged to use a large, public MPC with thorough security analysis. In the interim, they are advised to disable functionality (e.g., shielded transactions) that relies on the affected proof system.

References
**********

[BCTV14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879

[PGHR13] https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/279

[BGG17] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/602

[Parno15] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/437

[BCGTV15] https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2015/papers-archived/6949a287.pdf

[snarkjs] https://github.com/iden3/snarkjs

Papers inheriting this issue from [BCTV14]:

[BBFR14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/617

[Fuchsbauer17] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/587

Correspondence to Horizen and Komodo

Hello,

There is a serious vulnerability in your software. Enclosed is a private advisory with more detail about the vulnerability. We strongly recommend keeping the impact of this issue secret until your project is able to deploy mitigations, because of the associated risks to projects that are still affected and people who know the details.

The issue was discovered internally at Zcash and extreme caution has been exercised to protect its existence from premature disclosure, to avoid exploitation anywhere and to assure the availability of our network and the safety of our people. With the activation of Sapling, our network is no longer vulnerable to this bug, but we’d like to take the right steps to provide you a similar opportunity without putting any of our people at risk.

The vulnerability allows an attacker to create very large, virtually unlimited amounts of counterfeit shielded tokens without detection.

In order to mitigate this bug, we recommend a hardfork that adopts the newer Groth16 implementation of Sprout shielded transactions, which uses a more secure circuit implementation and parameters and is not affected by this bug.

This mitigation was successfully deployed in Zcash as part of the Sapling network upgrade. This mitigation has several advantages, but among them is that it does not require alerting anyone to the existence of a security bug in order to deploy, because the upgrade has legitimate performance and security benefits beyond fixing this bug.

Other possible mitigations for this bug have been analyzed and determined to be too expensive and risky to undertake. Further, revealing those considerations would make it harder for you to protect your users, given that other projects are also affected. Our best effort has been put into developing a strong mitigation to this bug in our own software, which we believe now presents you with a far simpler upgrade path than you might otherwise face.

We have disclosed this to the largest projects who use this code by market cap in order to protect the largest possible amount of capital, however we have decided not to alert all other affected projects yet.

I would like to assign a CVE to this issue, then publish the full details of this vulnerability publicly and notify all remaining affected projects no later than ninety days from today’s date: Today is Tuesday November 13th 2018, meaning I’d like to publicly disclose full details of this issue before Monday February 11th 2019 at the latest.

I will do my best to assist you in understanding the software upgrade path.

Benjamin Winston bambam@z.cash
Director of Product Security, z.cash

Title
*****

Sprout shielded transaction bug allows for unlimited counterfeiting.

Description
***********

A fundamental cryptographic flaw exists that allows an attacker to create proofs that falsely convince the original Sprout zk-SNARK verifier of the correctness of a transaction.

Impact
******

By exploiting this bug, an attacker could create fake Sprout shielded notes containing large amounts of counterfeit funds without being detected.

Credit
******

We would like to include credit for this discovery in a coordinated public release after your software is fixed and your users are safe.

What is affected?
*****************

Any project that depends on the original Sprout system that was distributed in the initial launch of Zcash.

The original Sprout zk-SNARK system is comprised of the original Sprout circuit and parameters on the [BCTV14] proving system using libsnark and was used by the 1.x series of Zcash software (which also carried the “Sprout” name).

The original Sprout circuit implementation is here:
https://github.com/zcash/zcash/tree/master/src/zcash/circuit

The original Sprout zk-SNARK parameters are here:
https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-proving.key
https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-verifying.key

The Sprout proving and verifying routines are here:
https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/master/src/zcash/JoinSplit.cpp

The BCTV14 proving system implementation (in libsnark) is here:
https://github.com/zcash/zcash/tree/master/src/snark/libsnark/zk_proof_systems/ppzksnark/r1cs_ppzksnark

What is not affected?
*********************

The newer Sprout-on-Groth16 system used by Zcash mainnet for Sprout transactions on and after block 419200 is not affected by this bug. It uses a new Sprout circuit, that runs on the Groth16 proving system, new parameters and operates on the BLS12-381 curve implemented in the Bellman library.

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 circuit implementation is located here:
https://github.com/zcash-hackworks/sapling-crypto/tree/master/src/circuit

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 zk-SNARK parameters are located here:
https://z.cash/downloads/sprout-groth16.params

The new Sprout-on-Groth16 proving and verifying routines are located in the librustzcash library:
https://github.com/zcash/librustzcash

The Groth16 proving system is implemented in the Bellman Rust library:
https://github.com/zkcrypto/bellman

Mitigation
**********

We strongly recommend that you switch to the newer Sprout-on-Groth16 zk-SNARK system, as it is not vulnerable to this bug.

Publication Timeline
********************

We would like to publish this vulnerability publicly and notify all other affected projects who are not in our initial distribution list using Github’s security response system, and on our social media channels and website no later than 90 days from today’s date. Today is Tuesday November 13th 2018, meaning I’d like to publicly disclose full details of this issue before Monday February 11th 2019 at the latest.

References
**********

[BCTV14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879

The post Zcash Counterfeiting Vulnerability Successfully Remediated appeared first on Zcash.



from Zcash

Friday, February 1, 2019

Zcash Shielded Addresses are GDPR Compliant by Default

The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force earlier this year. It establishes the rights of EU citizens with regard to data protection and privacy, and it regulates the collection, processing and export of personal data outside the region. Sweeping data privacy regulation like the GDPR is soon to be the rule — not the exception. This has sparked a necessary discussion about how blockchain-based technologies apply within the context of the regulation, due to the public nature of transaction data in most applications, where there is a credible risk of identifiable information being linked back to a specific individual.

Consumers demanding protection of data

The risks associated with storing and processing personal data result in information being stolen from millions of people each year, sometimes with life-altering consequences. As a result, consumers are increasingly demanding better protection and care of their data, and businesses are awakening to the fact that such protection is critical. With breaches leading to public outcry and revenue losses in the billions of dollars, putting the control of data back into the hands of customers reduces liability while empowering individuals.

Zcash supports regulatory requirements

As a privacy-protecting digital currency, Zcash is particularly well-positioned to support the regulatory requirements. Shielded addresses enable users to send and receive Zcash without publicly disclosing their addresses or the amount transacted. According to a recent TechGDPR report contracted by the Zcash Company to analyze the use of Zcash within a subscription payment system, these private addresses prevent publicly transmitted information from being linked back to an individual, therefore making them compliant for GDPR purposes and out of the scope of the regulatory requirements.

GDPR compliant by default

This is precisely the reason Germany-based company Least Authority (a sibling to Zcash Company) included shielded addresses as a component in their design of P4, a private periodic payments protocol, as described in a recent press release.

Shielded addresses are GDPR compliant by default, which is an important contrast to a scenario where compliance is sought after the fact. These addresses are never at risk of leaking data in a post-compliance scenario because they neither store nor transmit identifiable information at any point in the transaction process. In most other blockchain implementations transaction data is always public, and prevailing guidance suggests the destruction of private keys for compliance.

Within Zcash, users may consent to sharing transaction data with select third parties. This is permitted under GDPR as long as the third party can demonstrate that it has been authorized by the individual.

Zcash a meaningful mechanism for consent

We are at the beginning of what promises to be a longer journey toward privacy-by-design in the realm of blockchain technology. We believe the Zcash Company is uniquely positioned to lead the charge in advocating for an individual’s right to consent to the processing and sharing of personal data. We are committed to continued exploration about where privacy-preserving blockchain technologies intersect with regulatory compliance mandates and how Zcash can serve as a meaningful mechanism for consent within the boundaries of compliance.

The post Zcash Shielded Addresses are GDPR Compliant by Default appeared first on Zcash.



from Zcash

Thursday, January 10, 2019

Galaxy Digital Begins OTC Trading of Zcash

We are excited to announce that Galaxy Digital, a diversified merchant bank founded by Mike Novogratz, has begun OTC (over-the-counter) trading and two-sided liquidity solutions of Zcash.

Galaxy joins other OTC trading firms in trading Zcash — including Circle Trade, Cumberland and Genesis Trading.

Galaxy Digital Trading (GDT) brings world-class experience from traditional finance to the crypto space. Their support reinforces Zcash as one of the premier projects in the cryptocurrency space. 

Yoshi Nakamura, Global Head of Sales for Galaxy, added, “Galaxy Digital Trading is excited to welcome Zcash into its list of tokens that we trade OTC. We look forward to the continued development of a blockchain/token ecosystem that is fundamentally changing the world.”

To learn more about Zcash for Institutional Investors and Family Offices, visit: https://z.cash/investors/. For inquiries about Galaxy Digital Trading, please visit https://www.galaxydigital.io/services/trading/ or email.

The post Galaxy Digital Begins OTC Trading of Zcash appeared first on Zcash.



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Monday, January 7, 2019

Zcash Reference Wallet Light Client Protocol

This is the third installment in our series about the progress and development of the Zcash reference wallet; we invite you to look back at previous articles about our goals and what we’re building as well as user experience, interface and styling. This article builds on those topics, with a discussion about the protocol.

Note: the reference wallet, along with the work described in this post, is ongoing and subject to updates. 

A reference implementation is concrete and functioning code, proving that a concept can work. Recall that Sapling made shielded transactions computationally feasible for low-capacity devices, such as smartphones.

Zcash shielded transactions can work on mobile devices. Our reference wallet and light client library proves that. Light clients are important, because users with low-capacity devices can maintain security assurance about the Zcash network and verify transactions.

Interacting components

The Zcash reference wallet is a light client. Light clients help users access and interact with a blockchain in a secure and decentralized way without having to sync the full blockchain. Light clients are serviced by a full node server that handles those services.

For security reasons, the light client holds the spending key and generating transactions. This ensures that the owner is in charge of the funds in the wallet, and the server cannot spend the funds without permission. The server is responsible for keeping up with the blockchain data, verifying that transactions happened safely, and servicing many light clients by providing them relevant information.

Higher standards for privacy 

The typical server can see the details of shielded transactions. This information includes the sender, receiver, and amount. They use that to forward transactions relevant to their clients. For Zcash, this can be done by giving a server the viewing keys to the light clients’ addresses they service.

We want to prevent servers from learning what and how a light client spends or receives funds, to protect the privacy of our users. So, we are working on an alternative solution.

The first version of the reference wallet will not meet these goals, since the server will know which transactions are being spent by a given light client. But until they are spent the server will not know which transactions are received by a particular light client.

Preserving inbound privacy

Our design pre-processes blocks on the blockchain so that a light client can then scan through all the information itself. This is tricky since the reference wallet only uses shielded addresses. Since every shielded transaction is encrypted, light clients need to try decrypting every one on the network. If they do not, they might not to see that a transaction has sent successfully or miss detecting new incoming transactions.

This is bandwidth-intensive. To optimize the performance, we:

  • pass along only sapling shielded transactions
  • scan blocks only after sapling activation
  • download the transaction memo field on demand

The memo field is ~70% of a Zcash block. Shielded transactions pad the memo field to reduce distinctive features that could be used to identify them, even if the memo field is not used. Zcash blocks can be trial decrypted the rest of the block to find out the sender, receiver, and amount without decrypting the memo field. To achieve a 70% improvement in bandwidth, we decided to have light clients only decrypt the non-memo parts of a shielded address at first. This makes memo fields second-class citizens, and light clients will reveal which transactions are of interest if they request a specific transaction’s memo.

This is our solution for now. We plan to validate this approach and exploring other approaches in order to improve the user experience and in particular to make sure that using the memo field is useful and secure.

For further information, check out the protocol specification, client side code, and server side code.

Warning: it’s a work in progress so the code is unstable. We do not recommend builds off of it.

What’s next?

We will continue to share our progress in these upcoming posts:

  • Development: build methodology and target devices.
  • Future work: what’s next for the reference wallet.

Subscribe to the Zcash blog for further updates and other company news.

The post Zcash Reference Wallet Light Client Protocol appeared first on Zcash.



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Monday, December 3, 2018

Coinbase Announces Support for Zcash

Today Coinbase announced support for Zcash trading on Coinbase Pro. This provides over 20 million Coinbase customers with access to Zcash and is the first privacy-protecting currency listed on Coinbase.

In their press release, Coinbase said that they “…will support deposits from both transparent and shielded addresses, but only support withdrawals to transparent addresses. In the future, we’ll explore support for withdrawals to shielded addresses in locations where it complies with local laws.”

Coinbase also described the distinction between Zcash’s transparent and shielded transactions as analogous to the distinction between unencrypted HTTP and encrypted HTTPS. This is true. However, transparent addresses work just like Bitcoin and most other cryptocurrencies. As such, the analogy extends to every cryptocurrency that is without encryption to protect user privacy.

We are happy to hear that Coinbase has committed to exploring support for withdrawals to shielded addresses and believe this is a strong signal to the cryptocurrency, regulatory and financial community that they both respect the privacy rights of their users, and believe that privacy can and should be supported within regulated environments.

The Zcash Company’s mission is to empower everyone with economic freedom and opportunity. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin provide many of the properties necessary to provide that freedom but transactions on a blockchain are visible to everyone. Zcash takes Bitcoin one step further by also protecting the privacy of law-abiding citizens, guarding them against harm by bad actors through the use of a cryptographic standard called zero-knowledge proofs. This allows users to send and receive Zcash without disclosing the sender, receiver or the amount transacted.

As the industry matures, we believe privacy protections will be mandated by most exchanges, governments and other financial institutions, leading to the broad adoption of Zcash. This announcement from Coinbase is a significant step toward providing access to Zcash for millions of people around the world.

The post Coinbase Announces Support for Zcash appeared first on Zcash.



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Thursday, November 15, 2018

Zcash Strategy Update, November 2018

TLDR

The Zcash Company strategic priorities are as follows:

  1. Drive adoption while maintaining quality
  2. Invest in our team
  3. Increase openness and collaboration

 

Background

When the Zcash Company team came together at Zcon0 in Montreal back in June, we published a roadmap that publicly communicated our priorities going forward. Since that time, the team has been heads down, focusing on a major network upgrade called Sapling.

The team is ecstatic that the Sapling upgrade successfully activated last month. Sapling radically increases the performance of the magical zero-knowledge proofs (known as zk-SNARKs). Why should anybody care? Well, this improvement means that the private transactions that are Zcash’s raison d’être are now performant enough to work on mobile devices and hardware wallets.

With that major product and engineering work now live on the mainnet, it’s time to turn our attention to communicating publicly about our strategy for the balance of 2018 and 2019. We’ve managed to distill the five priorities coming out of Zcon0 down to three.

 

Priority #1: Drive adoption while maintaining quality

Zcash is amazing science that’s now been productionized. However, it’s admittedly been very difficult to use. An analogy that one of our founding scientists, Matthew Green, likes to use is that at Zcash we’ve “built a flying car,” but until recently the car had no doors.

The team’s focus since inception has been building highly-stable and secure back-end code to support a robust protocol, while leaving the development of front-end, user application code to the broader ecosystem. To date, this has left Zcash enthusiasts in a situation where they can either use the Linux command line interface, or use a community-supported GUI application — both of which depend on the user operating a “full node” and keeping the full Zcash blockchain synchronized locally. Neither of these options are viable for driving adoption in a mobile-first world.

Recognizing that we need to “put some doors on the flying car,” after Zcon0 we created a “Reference Wallet Team” that has focused on building a reference open source mobile wallet. It  implements both design and privacy best-practices and gives ecosystem developers the tools they need to build Zcash wallets for a variety of platforms. This team will also be releasing a “light client protocol” specification and reference implementation, which will make it easy for developers to create Zcash wallet applications that provide robust privacy without requiring that the user maintain a local copy of the entire blockchain.

The Zcash Foundation (independent of Zcash Company) is also working to drive adoption, supporting developers who are creating both desktop wallet applications and mobile applications that support private Zcash transactions. The Foundation recently announced winners of the 2018Q2 grant program, which includes a shielded transaction-capable Electron Zcash wallet.

The team is also spending lots of time engaging with our ecosystem partners, to ensure that exchanges and wallet providers are able to support their customers and drive adoption.

All this work to put “doors on the flying car” is gaining momentum, and we expect that by Q2 2019, it will be easier to securely transact with Zcash than it is to insecurely transact with other cryptocurrencies.

The second piece of this strategic pillar is to “maintain quality and security.”  Quality has always been a priority at the Zcash Company. We have developed an integrated set of security practices which includes scientific peer review, code review, unit tests, migrating to Rust away from C++, and information sharing with other projects. We target a conservative rate of change, refusing to add options and features unnecessarily. We complemented our already-robust audit practice by hiring a full-time director of product security and an information security engineer in early Q3.

 

Priority #2: Invest in the team

The Zcash Company team has grown significantly since its inception back in 2015. While we aspire to protect our startup roots and avoid unnecessary “corporatization,” we recognize that with growth comes change. For a long time, we’ve provided competitive compensation and benefits to our employees, and we’re now complementing those core programs with flexible PTO, a performance management process, and a more formal mentoring program so that our newer engineers can learn from our seniors.

We realize that our people are our greatest asset, and as such, we are committed to helping our employees chart a course — to realize their career aspirations and to understand where they are strong and where they have room to grow.

We are a distributed company, and the vast majority of our collaboration occurs over the internet. That said, we do appreciate the value of face-to-face time, and we will continue to bring everybody together at least twice a year to align on strategy while building connective tissue as an organization.

 

Priority #3: Increase openness and collaboration

Zcash is an open source, permissionless cryptocurrency. Anybody can run a Zcash node and participate in the network. Likewise, anybody can see, hack on and contribute to the Zcash source code. We are very pleased to see that the Zcash Foundation has entered into a partnership with Parity to create a completely independent (from the Zcash Company) full node implementation of the Zcash software in the Rust programming language.

Going forward, we want to encourage the open source community to engage with the Zcash ecosystem and to contribute to the project. There are a variety of ways to engage with Zcash today, including participating in the Zcash Community Chat, which allows for direct interaction with Zcash core contributors. We also have lively interactions with our community on Twitter, our blog, Reddit, etc.  Looking ahead, we are considering a revamp of the chat infrastructure to provide even more transparency and engagement between our core developers and the community.

We recognize that the mining community plays an important role in maintaining the decentralization and security of the Zcash cryptocurrency. Equihash, the proof-of-work algorithm that powers the Zcash protocol was intended to be ASIC-resistant, meaning that it would be profitable to mine Zcash using commodity GPU hardware. However, as Zcash increased in value over time, hardware manufacturers like Bitmain and Innosilicon brought products to market that mine Zcash more efficiently than GPUs. We recognize that this development is an inevitable effect of the rising value of Zcash and believe that long term, “ASIC resistance” is unsustainable. ASIC mining also helps protect the security and stability of the Zcash network, so we don’t want to stamp it out entirely. We do believe, however, that a diverse mining community consisting of both ASIC miners and GPU miners is desirable, and as such will be making changes to our proof of work to encourage miners from both camps to participate.

 

Summary

The Zcash Company strategic priorities are as follows:

  1. Drive adoption while maintaining quality
  2. Invest in our team
  3. Increase openness and collaboration

To put this strategy into action, we have created an operating plan, which we will be sharing with the world here shortly. Stay tuned.

 

The post Zcash Strategy Update, November 2018 appeared first on Zcash.



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Defense Against Counterfeiting in Shielded Pools

Zcash private addresses and transactions ensure that users are protected from the watchful eye of those wishing to exploit the use of data generally made available on public blockchains. This comes come with certain risks. For example, there are limited means to immediately detect a bug in a zk-SNARK circuit that allows an attacker to counterfeit coins.

That said, we are able to detect that counterfeiting has occurred by using the expected shielded pool totals. ZEC is created by miners into transparent addresses, and subsequently shielded, which increases the total ZEC in that pool. The pool total decreases when ZEC held in shielded addresses is spent to unshielded addresses. If the total goes negative, we know that counterfeiting has taken place.

Upon detecting this condition, the Zcash Company would begin its investigation into the possible source of the vulnerability as well as which pool, or pools, are affected. If we are able to identify that the bug affects only a single shielded pool, we might choose to effectively deactivate that pool by invalidating any of its outgoing transactions. A necessary consequence of this action is that any legitimate funds would also be lost forever in the affected pool.

Once the bug has been identified and remediated, Zcash nodes would be okay to resume normal operation. While these actions would be quite disruptive to the network, they are necessary for the long term viability of Zcash and for the safety of its users.

The post Defense Against Counterfeiting in Shielded Pools appeared first on Zcash.



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Friday, November 2, 2018

Zcash Company Continues to Attract Talent

The Zcash Company team continues to attract world-class talent to advance its mission of empowering everyone with economic freedom and opportunity. Over the last five months, ten people have joined the project, including two notable executive hires.

Andy Murray signed on as the chief financial officer in June and brings extensive executive experience. Over the past 20 years he served as CFO at a public software company and multiple private software companies where he successfully raised a combined total of over $140M in capital, streamlined expenses, positioned the organizations for growth, and helped shape companies for increased shareholder value.

In September, David Campbell joined Zcash Company as the chief operating officer. David brings 20 years of industry experience, including previous roles as vice president of IT and chief security officer for SendGrid (NYSE: SEND), as well as founding CEO at JumpCloud and Electric Alchemy.

During these past few months, we have also had to bid farewell to two very talented team members, Hugh Kahn and Jay Graber. Hugh founded the Denver office and established the engineering team based there. He worked to create a more efficient engineering process at Zcash Company by implementing an agile process. Jay leaves us after having made a variety of significant contributions over time, from core engineering to user support and maintaining the Zcash website. She lead the XCAT Project/Project Alchemy, wrote the Zcash testnet faucet app and the specifications and implementation for Overwinter’s transaction expiry.

Savannah Baily
Human Resources Specialist
Savannah is an advocate for helping individuals fulfill their passion through their work,  and she is excited to have found her home at Zcash Company. She loves learning from her teammates about how to make a more enjoyable workplace, especially with the added challenge of a remote team. In her free time, Savannah likes scavenger hunts, traveling and discussing movie plot holes.

Kevin Gorham
Android Developer
Kevin is an independent contractor who brings an extensive background in server-side platform development and DevOps—but he’s passionate about Android and Kotlin. Over the course of more than a decade, Kevin has often served in lead roles on a wide range of projects including startups, National Defense and Walmart Labs. He has shipped over 40 apps to the Google Play store, each with ratings above 4 stars. He holds a B.S. in computer science from Georgia Tech.

Elise Hamdon
Communications Manager
Elise has been a lifelong advocate for equalizing opportunity across borders and boundaries. She served as the director of several global education offices at universities in the United States. She also worked with the World Bank and Australian government on global education initiatives. She holds a Ph.D. in educational administration from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research focused on developing a student visa framework based on best practices with the goal of equalizing access to higher education for citizens of all nations.

Mary Moore-Simmons
Operations Manager
Mary has worked in the software space for seven years and specializes in engineering operations. She’s passionate about economic freedom and equality, and she’s an avid cook who loves trying new things. She holds a B.S. in engineering from Harvey Mudd College.

Taylor Hornby
Information Security Engineer
Taylor returns to the team after a hiatus to pursue a master’s degree in quantum information. He will be applying his experience finding cryptography vulnerabilities to help secure Zcash’s users. He said, “I came back here because I missed the team, missed how much I was learning by working here, and I feel like it’s where I can do the most with my skills.”

Joseph Van Geffen
Design Lead
Joseph is an independent contractor who brings his 20 years of accomplished design leadership and proven experience to the team. His background includes overseeing the end-to-end design and development lifecycle of numerous products, applications, and programs. He adds value through strong leadership and mentoring. As an expert in User Experience and User Interaction Design, he has delivered results for major brands such as Capital One, Google, Sephora, and CurrentTV.  He holds a B.A. in computer Art and animation from SCAD.

Benjamin Winston
Director Of Product Security
Benjamin draws on a background in software security analysis, where he spent 10 years analyzing and breaking commercial software — much of it in support of financial organizations. After three years working with the firmware development teams at Fitbit on embedded security, he is making the transition to blockchain at Zcash Company. He holds a bachelor’s degree in theoretical physics from the University of Sheffield.

Kim Wolf
Executive Assistant To CTO
Kim previously served as the director of human resources and executive assistant to the CEO at Revolution Analytics, which grew from a 20-person startup to a 100-plus-employee company within three years and was recently acquired by Microsoft. There, Kim cultivated culture change and human resources policy, and she led the work stream for the Microsoft acquisition.

The post Zcash Company Continues to Attract Talent appeared first on Zcash.



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Wednesday, October 31, 2018

Introducing the Zcash Reference Wallet

Our current goal at Zcash Company is to increase the adoption and use of shielded addresses. This work is aimed at empowering everyone with economic freedom and opportunity through an open, permissionless and private payment system.

Zcash Company is building a reference light client wallet featuring a Sapling shielded address that can receive and send transactions. The objective of this project is to prove that shielded transactions can work on mobile devices and to build reusable solutions for functionality required to support shielded addresses.  

Shielded transactions  

Unlike other cryptocurrencies, Zcash has two types of addresses, transparent and shielded. This results in four basic types of transactions: transparent, shielding, deshielding and shielded.  Shielded transactions, transactions from one shielded address to another, provide the most financial privacy by encrypting identifying data on the blockchain — such as the sender, recipient and transaction amount. These are our favorite transactions!

 

The Sapling network upgrade — released Oct. 28 — greatly improved the performance of creating these shielded transactions.  Prior to this upgrade, shielded addresses were too computationally intensive to run on a mobile device, and could only be accessed via a full node client. Now that it is possible for mobile devices to support shielded addresses, we want to encourage the community to support them.  

Reference wallet

Our reference wallet has a minimal number of features, and for a reason: It is not designed to be an end user application, but rather a resource. The reference wallet’s goal is to deliver a light client example that focuses on Sapling shielded interactions, leverages a zcashd full node as a server in a privacy-preserving way, and consumes the native rust implementation of Zcash wallet components. The reference wallet secondarily also serves as a design example of a single-currency application that only uses shielded addresses and leverages Zcash-specific features not commonly supported by multi-currency wallets.

Given the technical challenges associated with implementing shielded addresses, the most obvious but non-privacy preserving way for a light client to interact with a server is to give the server its viewing key. Then, the server can see which transactions belong to a particular shielded address and pass those relevant transactions along. However, we don’t find this to be a satisfying solution because it does not meet our privacy goals:

  • The server should not learn which transactions belong to a given wallet.
  • The server should not learn which transactions are being spent by a given wallet.

We are working on an initial solution that preserves the privacy of the light clients. For instance, we pre-process blockchain information so that a wallet can feasibly scan through it itself to look for incoming transactions, but more efficiently than if it had to download the raw blocks and try decrypting them in a naive way.

We have already started work on the reference wallet, and we plan to share our progress and all resulting design and code in a series of forthcoming blog posts.

Coming up

A series of blog posts will feature specific areas of the reference wallet work:   

  • Design: user experience priorities, user interface design, and styling choices
  • Protocol: technical challenges, interacting components, and privacy goals
  • Implementation: target devices, build methodology, and security measures

Come back to the Zcash blog or follow us on Twitter for further updates!

The post Introducing the Zcash Reference Wallet appeared first on Zcash.



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Tuesday, October 16, 2018

Thursday, October 4, 2018

Perspectives on Regulation from Van Valkenburgh

We’re changing things up this week and presenting a three-video set featuring Peter Van Valkenburgh, Director of Research at Coin Center. Van Valkenburgh is also a member of the Zcash Foundation Board of Directors. In the first clip, Van Valkenburgh discusses the three main branches of regulatory policy that touch cryptocurrency, covering topics ranging from ICOs to anti-money laundering.

“… I think the warrant requirement for investigations into your financial bank records might be reasonable. That’s a big part of why I believe in privacy-protecting technologies like Zcash.” — P. Van Valkenburgh

 

In the second segment, Van Valkenburgh recounts how a recent approval by the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) signals a positive step forward in the relationship between privacy-protecting technologies and regulatory compliance.

“… The decision of the Department of Financial Services to allow Gemini to list Zcash as one of their currency pairs — Zcash to dollars — was a pretty encouraging moment.” — P. Van Valkenburgh

  The final video in this set features Van Valkenburgh’s views on how to achieve regulatory objectives related to law enforcement, in a world where new technologies like privacy on the blockchain exist.

“… I have not seen or heard of anyone calling specifically for heavy-handed regulation, in the way that you have in some other countries around the world, for a ban, or anything like that, or even for direct regulation of those who do protocol development in these technologies.” — P. Van Valkenburgh

  A library of prior videos in the Perspectives series is available on the Zcash YouTube channel, including these features: On Privacy: Eran Tromer Zash Founding Scientist, Associate Professor at Tel Aviv University and Associate Research Scientist at Columbia University on Privacy Zooko Wilcox Zcash Founder and CEO on the History of Privacy Linda Xie Co-Founder of Scalar Capital on Bitcoin Traceability Zcash CTO Nathan Wilcox on Privacy Ethereum Founder and Chief Scientist Vitalik Buterin on Privacy Coin Center Director of Research and Zcash Foundation Board Member Peter Van Valkenburgh on Privacy Industry Thought Leader Jill Carlson on Privacy On Governance: Nathan Wilcox on Zcash Governance Jonathan Zeppettini (JZ) on Decred Governance Vitalik Buterin Discusses On-chain Governance On Regulation: Sean Bowe on Privacy and Regulation Jack Gavigan on Regulation and Privacy-Protecting Technology On Sapling: Zcash Engineer Sean Bowe Zcash Engineer Ariel Gabizon

The post Perspectives on Regulation from Van Valkenburgh appeared first on Zcash.



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Monday, December 4, 2017

New Empirical Research into Zcash Privacy

A researcher from University of Michigan-Dearborn, Jeffrey Quesnelle, published a paper and blog today about the effective privacy on the Zcash blockchain over the first year of its existence. No vulnerabilities in Zcash were uncovered in this research. However, the research underscores a specific way that Zcash — like any other …



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Tuesday, October 17, 2017

Zerocoin Electric Coin Company Integrates Zero-knowledge Security Technology on J.P. Morgan’s Quorum

New York, October 17, 2017 - The Zerocoin Electric Coin Company and J.P. Morgan today announced the integration, and initial release of, zero-knowledge security layer (ZSL) technology on Quorum, J.P. Morgan’s enterprise, smart contract blockchain platform. The combination further unlocks the potential of blockchain technology for enterprise use …



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Thursday, June 8, 2017

Pay-to-sudoku Revisited

Last year, I created a project called pay-to-sudoku which was the world's first implementation of a zero-knowledge contingent payment (ZKCP). ZKCPs were invented in 2011 by Gregory Maxwell, and are a clever cryptographic trick that allows people to trade information and value atomically over a blockchain. Gregory was also kind …



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Monday, May 22, 2017

Press release: Zero-knowledge Security Layer to be Added to Quorum Blockchain Platform

The Zerocoin Electric Coin Company (ZECC), developers of the Zcash™ digital currency, today announced a partnership with J.P. Morgan, one of the world’s largest banks, to add technology from Zcash to J.P. Morgan's enterprise blockchain platform, Quorum.

This technology will extend Quorum’s existing privacy protections — which …



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Wednesday, April 19, 2017

Payment Contexts & Reusing Shielded Addresses

The privacy provided in Zcash allows users to disclose a shielded payment address publicly or to multiple individuals without the worry of transactions sent to that address becoming linked in the blockchain. When sending to or from a shielded address, the data involved in that side of the transaction is …



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Monday, April 3, 2017

State of the Network: 1,000,000 ZEC Edition

The Zcash blockchain has completed the distribution of the first 1,000,000 Zcash coins. Only 20,000,000 more to go! Now's a good time for your irregularly scheduled “State of the Network” update.


It has been five months since the beginning of the blockchain. The network has been …



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Wednesday, March 8, 2017

R3 Report on Confidentiality & Privacy for Blockchains

Last year, R3 commissioned us to co-author (along with Danny Yang, founder of blockchain analytics company Blockseer) a report that compares and contrasts the different techniques for making blockchains more private. The report was completed in early November and distributed to the R3 consortium’s membership, where it was well-received. Today, R3 have published it on their website.

In the report, we describe and compare various approaches to adding confidentiality and privacy to blockchains, including various tumbling and mixing protocols such as Coinjoin and Coinshuffle, the use of stealth addresses, Pedersen commitments with range proofs (more commonly known as Confidential Transactions), ring signatures (used by Monero) and zero-knowledge proofs (as implemented in Zcash). We also take a look at the Hawk and Enigma protocols for enabling the use of private smart contracts and multi-party computation of encrypted data.

The report is aimed at a non-technical audience, so our descriptions and explanations of how the various techniques work, are written to facilitate a high-level understanding by people with no background in computer science or cryptography, rather than being exhaustively accurate. For people who are interested in delving deeper into the detail that we have glossed over, we’ve provided links in the footnotes to the relevant source material and academic papers.

Blockchain technology is a fast-evolving field, so this report is necessarily a snapshot of the confidential and privacy techniques that were public at the time it was written. The intervening months have seen the release of R3's Corda and JP Morgan's Quorum, and Chain has previewed their "Confidential Assets" technology. We expect to see further developments and progress in this space throughout 2017.

We’d like to thank R3 for commissioning this report, and our co-author Danny Yang for working with us to make it happen. We’d also like to thank everyone who provided feedback and suggestions, particularly Andrew Miller, Antony Lewis, Ariel Gabizon, Emily Rutland, Ian Grigg, Ian Miers, Mike Ward, Paige Peterson, Shihao Guo, Tim Swanson and Vitalik Buterin.

Download the report in PDF format.



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Thursday, March 2, 2017

A Shielded Ecosystem

In Zcash, users have the option to employ transparent or shielded addresses for sending, receiving and storing their ZEC. While this decision might initially seem like a choice that only affects the visibility of a single user’s personal finances, the greater ecosystem is affected by the overall trend of users choosing one or the other. In our Transaction Linkability blog post, we explained how a user's financial privacy is strengthened by the use of shielded addresses by friends and businesses they transact with. This post explains why an increase in shielded address use supports overall ecosystem privacy.

Strength In Numbers and Diversity

To better understand the ecosystem-wide effects of shielding in Zcash, first consider the more common privacy practice of mailing documents and letters in envelopes. The documents on their own are a set of unique objects but once sealed inside an envelope, look relatively similar to other mailed documents.

Now, imagine a world where most people mail non-sensitive messages on postcards and save the masking feature of envelopes for more classified information such as tax and bank documents. Even though the contents of the more sensitive documents remain sealed in envelopes, the smaller set of envelopes and narrowed use-case makes envelopes an easier target for someone like an identity thief on the hunt for personal information. The decreased use of envelopes for non-sensitive correspondence creates a higher chance that envelopes will contain classified information and a higher rate of success for bad actors.

Now compare that to the current world where people use envelopes for a wider range of purposes, even mundane correspondences. The increased quantity of sealed messages forms a larger set of similar-looking objects, when in fact, their contents are diverse. This might force an identity thief to reconsider their risk to reward ratio for targeting envelopes.

Shielding The Zcash Ecosystem

In the Zcash ecosystem, the number of shielded addresses and diversity of use has a similar effect on the ability to analyze sensitivity of transactions.

A depiction of a transaction graph with a smaller number of shielded addresses

When a smaller number of shielded addresses are used in transactions, the diversity of use is limited. So in a situation where the value held in shielded addresses is 50% of all ZEC but the number of shielded addresses is 10%, then it's relatively trivial to assume that shielded addresses on average have a higher balance, making them a higher target for attempts at theft. This smaller shielded set can also provide an easier time for an observer of the Zcash blockchain to build identity profiles for users of shielded addresses. Public data like the timestamps associated with transactions sent from shielded addresses is one way that those users might be at risk for loss of privacy.

A depiction of a transaction graph with a larger number of shielded addresses

On the other hand, in a Zcash ecosystem with a larger set of transactions between shielded addresses, analysis of those transactions and the individuals behind them is less effective. Even better, if all Zcash users employ shielded addresses including for the more mundane purchases, then a bad actor’s rationale to attempt a targeted attack for theft or profiling becomes unreliable.

A Community Effort For A Shielded Ecosystem

Thankfully, unlike other methods by cryptocurrencies to provide user privacy, all shielded addresses look the same to observers of the Zcash blockchain, and therefore the quantity of shielded addresses in use directly correlates to the privacy of the ecosystem as a whole. At the time of this post, the number of Zcash transactions involving a shielded address is just above 29%, however the number of fully shielded transactions (strictly between shielded addresses) is a subset of this. Fortunately, this percentage has been moving in an upward trend.

As development continues and the ecosystem grows, we expect the above percentage to continue to rise in addition to the subset of fully shielded transactions. Support for shielded addresses in third-party services will be an important factor to this growth. Core development to reduce resource requirements and improve usability of shielded addresses is another key component towards a larger privacy pool and thriving shielded ecosystem. We continue to encourage the community to utilize shielded addresses for sending and receiving ZEC to strengthen the privacy for everyone.



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